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RECENT DECISIONS
commencement of the action".7 In pertinent language on the subject
the New Hampshire court in Easter v. Easter said, "One honestly
prosecuting a supposedly sound suit for divorce cannot be guilty of de-
sertion while so engaged; and one charged with offenses which imply
the consent of the other to a separation cannot be charged with deser-
tion within the meaning of the statute for refraining from he matri-
monial relation, both because the absence is justifiable and consented
to. One who has caused a separation by a groundless suit cannot charge
the other spouse with desertion." The time so consumed has been quite
appropriately termed "time out."9
The requirement of good faith as a necessary limitation to the rule
is best calculated to insure justice to both spouses. As was stated by
the Nevw Jersey court in Weigel v. Weigel,'0 "In all the cases which
state the proposition in general terms there is an assumption that the
case which relieves from the duty of cohabitation is one brought in good
faith in order to submit to the courts a condition of facts which the
complainant really believes entitles her to the relief sought. It is un-
doubtedly the injured spouse's right to have a judicial determination
of the action unembarrassed by the adverse presumptions raised by her
continued cohabitation with the other party." Conversely, if the action
is not brought in good faith, it is a fraud on the court which justifies
it in refusing to give any effect to the action.
Ricnan C. GORMLEY
Domestic Relations -The Presumption of the Validity of the Sec-
ond Marriage - The deceased married Mabel Von Pilcher in Lyon
county, Kansas, in 1901. They lived as husband and wife until their
separation in 1925. Sometime thereafter the deceased told his wife that
he had divorced her and, in 1926, relying on the deceased's statement,
Mabel began living with one Hal F. Showers as his wife. On June 21,
1941, the deceased married Mildred Pilcher at Logan county, Utah. One
month later Mildred learned of his prior marriage. During the years
1942 and 1943, Mildred and the deceased lived in California where
Mabel and Hal Showers, holding themselves out as husband and wife,
also lived. The two families became quite well acquainted, and Mabel
claimed that during this time the deceased came to her and told her
that he had never divorced her, and further that she had never divorced
him, nor had she ever been served with divorce papers. Upon his death,
Mildred was appointed administratrix of his estate. Mabel filed suit
to have Mildred removed as administratrix and herself substituted.
7 WIs. STAT. (1947) 247.07(4).
8 75 N.H. 270, 73 At. 30 (1909).
Holmstedt v. Holmstedt, 383 Ill. 290, 49 N.E. (2d) 25 (1943).
10 63 N.J.Eq. 677, 52 At. 1123 (1902).
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Held: judgment for Mabel reversed. Where a first wife attacks the
validity of her husband's second marriage, the burden of rebutting the
presumption of dissolution of the first marriage rests with her. Further-
more, a mere declaration by the first wife that she had never obtained
a divorce herself nor had been served by her husband with divorce pa-
pers is insufficient evidence to rebut a presumption of divorce. In Re Pil-
cher's Estate, Von Pilcher v. Pilcher, 197 P. (2d) 143 (Utah, 1948).
In the vast majority of American jurisdictions, the rule is followed
that the second marriage is presumed valid as against a prior marriage
and that the law will presume the dissolution by death or divorce of
the prior marriage.1 A fundamental rule of evidence is the basis for
the presumption in favor of the validity of the second marriage-the
elemental precept that a man is always presumed innocent until he is
proven guilty. Thus the law will presume divorce or death when ne-
cessary to sustain the validity of a second marriage of a person who has
previously been legally married.2 The indulgence of this presumption
has a long and favorable history in American courts, and most authori-
ties agree that to hold otherwise would result in undue hardship on the
parties to the second marriage in cases where either or both of them
were innocent of unlawful intent, and would also bastardize millions
of blameless children.'
On pondering the courtroom effect of the presumption, great dif-
ferences in opinion appear as to just what its strength should be. The
preponderance of authority credits it as one of the strongest presump-
tions known to law,4 and one case has gone so far as to state that
"proof of second marriage alone makes out a prima facie case of its
validity". 5 Despite the tendency of the courts to emphasize the strength
of this presumption, however, it is not generally considered conclusive
in law. It may be overcome by evidence, and almost universally our
courts place the burden of bringing forth evidence and overcoming
the presumption upon the party or parties seeking to attack such
validity.6
'Hager et al v. Brandt et al, 111 Iowa 746, 82 N.W. 1016 (1900) ; Harper v.
Fears, 168 Miss. 505, 151 So. 745 (1934); U.S. v. Hays, 20 Fed. 710 (1884);
Kolombatovich v. Magma Copper Co., 43 Ariz. 314, 30 P. (2d) 832 (1934);
Spears v. Spears, 178 Ark. 720, 12 S.W. 875 (1928); Louisa Coleman Che
Mah Dunn v. Starke Co. Trust and Savings Bank, 98 Ind. App. 86, 184 N.E.
424 (1933); Ray v. Social Security Board, 73 Fed. Supp.'58 (1947); Denton
v. Denton, 37 N.Y.S.(2d) 704 (1942); Kopit v. Ziberzmidt, 35 N.Y.S.(2d)
558 (1942); Roberts v. Roberts, 124 Fla. 116, 167 So. 808 (1936); Donofrio
v. Donofrio, 167 Wash. 80, 8 P.(2d) 966 (1932).
2 Harper v. Fears, 160 Miss. 505, 151 So. 745 (1934).
3 Ibid.
"4Pittinger v. Pittinger, 28 Col. 308, 4 Pac. 195 (1901).
Schaffer v. Richardson's Estate, 125 Md. 88, 93 Atl. 391 (1915).
6 Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550 (U.S. 1840) ; Gaines v. City of New Orleans,
6 Wall. 642 (U.S. 1856); Brownell v. Brownell, 74 N.Y.S.(2d) 136 (1947);
Reed v. Reed, 202 Ga. 508, 43 S.E.(2d) 539 (1947) ; J. J. Cater Furniture Co.
v. Banks, 152 Fla. 377, 11 So.(2d) 776 (1943).
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As to what proof is necessary to overcome the presumption of val-
idity, there is no universal agreement. Negatively, it is to be noted that
in one instance the mere discovery of the prior spouse still alive with-
out further evidence of no divorce was insufficient.7 Another case has
held that the mere testimony of a prior wife that she had not obtained
a divorce is not of such strength as to rebut.5 In a case before the
United States Supreme Court, the fact that an examination of state
records did not reveal the recording of a final decree of divorce was
held to be of doubtful value in overcoming the presumption.9 Affirma-
tively discussing the question, the last mentioned case in its opinion
calls for "substantial" evidence to rebut the presumption. 0 In an Ari-
zona case in 1934, the court called for evidence "clear and conclu-
sive as to fairly preclude other results". Further examination of
cases points out many differences in terms as to the degree of evi-
dence necessary in such a situation,' 2 but a very recent California case
holds that the burden of proof is sustained if it may be reasonably
ascertained from all of the evidence that the first marriage was not
dissolved by death of the spouse, or by annulment or divorce.' 3 On the
other hand, the United States District Court held in a 1949 Missouri
case that the burden of proof is not sustained unless the parties "com-
plete a chain of evidence" showing not only the validity of the first
marriage and its continuance, but also excludes ever possibility of the
validity of the secondV4
In direct opposition to the decision of the case at bar, and to the
results reached by the majority of American courts, the Wisconsin
Court in 1885, laid down the rule that there is no absolute presumption
against the continuance of the life of one of the parties to a prior mar-
riage in order to establish the innocence of the other party, and that
further, there is no absolute presumption of the dissolution of the first
marriage by a divorce prior to the second marriage.' 5 This decision
7United States v. Hays, 20 Fed. 710 (1884).8 Calloway v. Cox, 74 Ga. App. 555, 40 S.E. (2d) 578 (1946).
9 Ray v. Social Security Board, 73 Fed. Supp. 58 (1947).
10 Supra, note 9.
"- Kolombatovich v. Magma Copper Co., supra, note 1.
12 "Subsequent Remarriage of both Husband and Wife; Presumption of Validity
of Husband's Second Marriage," 6 Miss. L.J., 443-7.
'3In Re Smith's Estate, 201 P. (2d) 539 (1949). Here a wife married a second
time during the life of her first husband and relying upon his statement that
he had divorced her; she now claims against his estate as widow. Held:
evidence that there are no records of divorce between the parties to the prior
marriage in the state of California is sufficient.
14 Derrell v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 18 (1949).
15 Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 23 N.W. 110 (1885). In this case the hus-
band remarried during the life time of his first wife and without obtaining a
divorce or annulment; the second wife afterwards married again under
similar circumstances. Held: presumption was against the validity of hus-
band's second marriage.
1949]
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has never been overruled in Wisconsin, and a later case decided in
1908, substantially affirmed it in that point of law."6
The minority ruling as presented by the Wisconsin courts is upheld
in Pennsylvania,'17 Ohio, 8 Montana,' 9 Iowa,20 and Massachusetts. 21 The
Montana Court states its view of the question by saying that a prior
marriage, being shown undissolved, casts upon the relationship of the
parties to the second marriage the shadow of illegitimacy; they further
rule that upon this showing the "law's favorite presumption of inno-
cence" disappears, and the presumption of wrongdoing takes its place.
The burden of proof requires those asserting legitimacy to show the
validity of the subsequent marriage.22
The intention of the Wisconsin courts and of those other jurisdic-
tions following the minority view has been to preserve the integrity of
the marital status, a status which can only be properly dissolved by
death or by the legal fiction of divorce. The courts sustaining the ma-
jority view feel that their position, on the other hand, causes a lesser
hardship upon modem society, the innocent parties to the second mar-
riage, and the children of the second marriage. Nevertheless, although
the ruling case in Wisconsin was recently cited, erroneously it would
seem, as authority in a case following the majority view,23 the minority
opinion has been so long sustained in this state that it seems appar-
ent that Wisconsin will continue to uphold the rule first laid down in
this state in 1885.
MARGADETTE MOFFTT
Federal Taxation - Collateral Estoppel Where Decisional Law is
Changed or Clarified Between Trials Involving Different Tax Years -
The taxpayer was principal stockholder of a corporation, which he
licensed, under various royalty contracts, to manufacture and sell var-
ious devices, on which he had applied for patents. The taxpayer as-
signed his rights, title and interests in the contracts to his wife, at
various times, without consideration, and the royalty payments were
made to the wife. In 1935, the Board of Tax Appeals held the tax-
payer was not liable for income tax on payments made the wife during
16 Hilliard v. Wisconsin Life Insurance Co., 137 Wis. 208, 117 N.W. 999 (1908).
17Madison v. Lewis, 151 Pa. Super. 138, 30 A.(2d) 357 (1943). In this typical
fact situation the husband entered into a subsequent marriage while his
prior undivorced spouse was still living. Held: presumption of the con-
tinuing validity will be sustained.8 Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Dell, 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N.E. 669 (1922).
'2 Welch v. All Persons, etc., 85 Mont. 114, 278 Pac. 110 (1929).
20 Barnes v. Barnes, 90 Iowa 282, 75 N.W. 851 (1894).2 1 Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 89 N.E. 110 (1909).
2 2 Supra, note 19.
2 3 Supra, note 13.
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